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THE BANALITY OF EVIL AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
W. Bradley Wendel*
DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: How HATE SPEECH PAVES THE WAY FOR

By Alexander
New York University Press. 2002. Pp. x, 246. $40.
HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS.

Tsesis.

New York:

INTRODUCTION

In the late spring and early summer of 1994, hundreds of thousands
of people in Rwanda - an estimated ten percent of the population were brutally murdered by their fellow citizens, generally for the
"crime" of belonging to the socially and economically dominant, but
numerically minority Tutsi ethnic group.1 The slaughter followed a
systematic propaganda campaign coordinated by the Rwandan
government, dominated by members of the Hutu ethnic group, who
had long harbored grievances against Tutsis. The campaign demonized
Tutsis as "devils," stirred up fear among the largely rural and poor
Hutu population by propagating false information about a Tutsi
campaign to exterminate Hutus, and stated that killing Tutsis was a
civic duty for Hutus.2 Using the pretext of a plane crash that killed the
Rwandan president (which was falsely blamed on Tutsi insurgents),
Hutu extremists organized a countrywide effort by ordinary Hutus to
kill Tutsis, savagely, methodically, and in a chillingly routine manner
- peasant "workers" reported for duty in the morning, spent the day
hacking Tutsis to death with machetes, and then retired for the
evening to eat, drink, and sleep.3 When the killing finally ended in
July, an estimated 800,000 were dead, legions of refugees had swarmed
into neighboring countries, and Rwanda was in shambles.

* Associate Professor of Law, Cornell University. B.A. 1991, Rice; J.D. 1994, Duke;
LL.M. 1998, J.S.D. 2002 , Columbia. -Ed. I am grateful to Alex Tsesis for a valuable ongoing
conversation about the subject of this review, and to Steven Shiffrin and Anuj Desai fo r their
helpful comments on the manuscript.

1. See generally PHILI P GOUREVITCH, WE WISH To INFORM You THAT TOMORROW
WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA (1998).
2. See Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in
Rwanda's Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 545, 559-61 (1998).
3. See
(1995).

GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE

1404

255-56

May 2004)

The Banality of Evil and the First Amendment

1405

The Rwanda massacre took its place alongside other massive,
systematic, coordinated attempts to eliminate entire classes of people,
in a century already reeling from horrors such as the Armenian
genocide, the Holocaust, the Cambodian killing fields, and the
murders ordered by Stalin.4 The slaughter at Srebrenica would happen
in the next year.5 To many observers, these events revealed the
fragility of the very preconditions of civilization - trust, empathy,
reason, and understanding. Their occurrence inspires a kind of
collective helpless silence, recalling Theodor Adamo's admonition
that, after Auschwitz, to write a poem is barbaric.6 The complicity of
numerous "ordinary" people in the bureaucratically organized killings
continues to demand our reflection on the capacity for evil that seems
innate in human nature.7 Of course, earlier moral catastrophes such as
slavery and the slave trade and smaller-scale but nevertheless evil acts
such as rapes and lynchings deserve our critical reflection as well.
'
Despite the modern resources of education, culture, and the rule of
law, civilization appears to be a thin veneer for a pervasive human
capacity for brutality and an endless appetite to cause suffering.
An alternative response to the failure of social institutions to
restrain human cruelty is to persist in the optimistic belief that we can
still do more. Optimism need not be the naive Panglossian faith that
this world is already in its best possible state.8 Rather, it can consist of
a conviction that improvements in education, culture, or the law can
do a better job at keeping our capacity for violence in check.
Alexander Tsesis9 is an optimist in the latter sense. He holds fast to
ideals that demand that the world be different - ideals such as
equality, human dignity, peace, and toleration. In his view, decent
society must refuse to permit certain kinds of statements to be uttered,
namely those that express "hatred toward groups because of their
racial, historic, cultural, or linguistic characteristics" (p. 81). Tsesis
argues that violence against ethnic minorities and other outsider
4. For a sampling of the grim catalogs of modern savagery, see JONATHAN GLOVER,
HUMANITY: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE TwENTIETH CENTURY (1999), and SAMANTHA
POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE (2002).
5. See JAN
(1996).

WILLEM HONIG & NORBERT BOTH, SREBRENICA: RECORD OF A WAR

CRIME

6. See THEODOR ADORNO,
Seabury Press 1973) (1966).

NEGATIVE DIALECTICS

360-62 (E.B. Ashton trans., The

7. See SUSAN NEIMAN, EVIL IN MODERN THOUGHT: AN ALTERNATIVE HISTORY OF
PHILOSOPHY 254-55 (2002).
8. See GOTTFRIED w. LEIBNIZ, THEODICY: ESSAYS ON THE GOODNESS OF Goo, THE
FREEDOM OF MAN, AND THE ORIGIN OF EVIL ( E.M. Huggard trans., Austin Farrar ed.,

Open Court Publ'g 1985) (1951). The character of Pangloss in Voltaire's satire Candide is
intended to mock Leibniz's claim that all events in God's creation happen fo r the best.
9. Visiting Scholar, University of Wisconsin-Madison, School of Law, Institute fo r Legal
Studies and Visiting Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
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groups never occurs in isolation, but is legitimated and made more
likely by a background of social beliefs, customs, imagery, metaphors,
and stereotypes that degrade and dehumanize the outsiders.10 These
beliefs, in turn, are a product of the "emotive response elicited by the
repeated expression of disrespectful images about the ethical, political,
sexual, religious, or familial qualities of targeted groups" (p. 82). It is
an essential function of hate speech to lay the groundwork for violence
against disfavored groups by shaping the unconscious web of beliefs of
citizens - who will be willing to turn against their neighbors, or at
least to turn a blind eye to the resulting atrocities. For this reason,
Tsesis proposes criminalizing at least that subset of hate speech that
has a "realistic probability of inciting discrimination or violence" (p.
199), even if the pernicious effects of the speech take a long time to
materialize. "The longer destructive messages about minorities are
given free rein, the more likely it becomes that the hated group will be
considered unworthy of essential human rights" (p. 137). A speaker
whose words are not immediately acted upon should not be immune
from prosecution because, for all we know, his words may contribute
to a culture of bigotry that eventually sets the stage for acts of
violence.
His proposal is sufficiently radical that a reader might be tempted
to dismiss it outright, as wildly impractical ivory-tower theorizing, at
least in the U.S. legal system. Indeed, although Tsesis sometimes
seems to underplay the resulting disruption to existing constitutional
law, the acceptance of his criminal statute would require a great deal
more than marginal doctrinal tinkering. In Part I, I briefly describe the
chasm between modern First Amendment principles and a
comprehensive regulatory approach to the long-term harm created by
hate speech. Cases such as Brandenburg v. Ohio11 and New York
Times v. Sullivan12 are generally interpreted as underwriting a broad
protection for caustic criticism and advocacy that falls short of
incitement to commit imminent violent acts.13 Moreover, a reform like

10. P. 138; see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) [hereinafter Lawrence,
Unconscious Racism] (arguing that racial discrimination is the result of unconscious racial
motivation that is the product of cultural factors such as mass-media portrayals, parental
beliefs, and peer influences).
11. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
12. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
13. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA
228-31 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988). Tsesis relies on a narrow interpretation of the holding of
Sullivan that is technically correct - namely, that it applies only to defamation actions
against public officials. P. 146. However, Kalven's broader reading, that Sullivan creates a
zone of protection for unorthodox or critical ideas, even those that are extremely offensive,
is borne out by subsequent cases such as Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), and
R.A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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the one Tsesis favors has been tried in a related context, namely the
attempt to suppress pornography in order to prevent violence against
women.14 Although he does not discuss this episode, the Seventh
Circuit's invalidation of an Indianapolis antipornography statute, and
its summary affirmance by the Supreme Court, have been understood
as foreclosing the attempt to prevent violence by addressing its roots
in the false beliefs that result from pervasive exposure to hateful
messages.15 But the natural response to this critique is that it gives
undue weight to the status quo, and that Tsesis is making a normative
argument that stands apart from existing doctrine and provides a
perspective from which the law can be criticized (pp. 130, 138).
Although he does not self-identify as a critical scholar, his book
follows the critical methodology of unmasking the law's pretensions to
neutrality and inevitability.16 An adequate response to his argument
must accordingly be normative, not merely the emphatic reassertion of
legal rules.
The normative response I wish to consider in Part II centers on the
moral notion of responsibility and the consequences of the ascription
of blame to a significantly expanded set of actors. As an optimist,
Tsesis believes legal institutions can be reformed to address the
problems of stereotyping, discrimination, ethnocentricity, racial
scapegoating, and intolerance. Because these pathologies have such
complex etiologies, however, an adequate legal response must end up
targeting a vast domain of expression, including children's books that
play to stereotypes,17 much of the Western canon of literature,18
jokes,19 and popular music, movies, and television shows.20 Because
14. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Pornography].
15. See Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986). A summary affirmance is technically a decision on the merits by the U.S.
Supreme Court, as distinguished from a denial of certiorari. See KENT GREENAWALT,
SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 313 n.101 (1989).
16. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 17801860, at 254-58 (1977).
17. As Tsesis admits, "(c]hildren's acquisition of cultural dislikes and antagonisms
results from complex perceptions of multiple external stimuli: defamations about minorities,
experiences with how persons of other races are treated, parental cues about who are
appropriate companions, and the extent of interracial intercourse. " P. 107. Stereotypes in
children's literature are surely one of those stimuli, as Charles Lawrence's moving first
person account of the psychic harm caused by the children's book, Little Black Sambo,
shows. See Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 10, at 317-19.
18. Tsesis mentions the stereotypical Shylock from the Merchant of Venice and Fagin
from Oliver Twist. P. 111.
19. Sufficiently pervasive and severe racist jokes can create a hostile work environment
in violation of federal antidiscrimination statutes. See, e.g. , Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270
F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2001). Even joking not rising to the level of racial harassment can have the
cultural-conditioning effect that Tsesis describes, by reinforcing stereotypes and permitting
dominant groups to distance themselves from the butts of the jokes. Pp. 102-03.
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hardly anyone can claim not to be involved at some level with the
perpetuation of pervasive cultural stereotypes, Tsesis's proposal
spreads a layer of blame that is a mile wide and an inch deep. In moral
terms, this diffusion of responsibility risks turning into a process of
collective exoneration for the genuine evils of racism. For, as Hannah
Arendt has argued, "where all, or almost all, are guilty, nobody is."21
In short, Tsesis is right that racism touches everyone, and that violence
can spring from a climate of acceptance of racist beliefs, but he is not
justified in concluding that legal sanctions ought to be applied on the
basis of that complicity.
This criticism should not obscure the genuine accomplishment of
Tsesis's book, which is to focus the hate speech debate on explicitly
normative issues. Of course, the Court engages in policy-based
decisionmaking all the time, but it refuses to acknowledge as much,
which leads the justices into baroque doctrinal attempts to justify
regulation of speech on the basis of anything but· its substance witness the secondary-effects doctrine,22 the captive-audience rule,23
and the permissibility of regulating the time, place, and manner of
speech.24 By demanding a normative argument for regulating, say,
adult movie theaters but not Ku Klux Klan rallies, Tsesis is continuing
the scholarly efforts of not only Stanley Fish,25 but also a number of
outsider scholars who have consistently challenged the moral basis for
purportedly neutral legal principles.26 If neutrality and the appeal to
principled adjudication is just a mask for a particular ideological
agenda, it is fair to demand a moral justification for that agenda.
In the end, though, Tsesis is vulnerable to the argument that the
criminal law is too blunt an instrument to deal with the diffuse and
unconscious racism that critical race-theory scholarship has uncovered
so effectively. Consider this provocative excerpt from a speech by
Richard Delgado:
[P] owerful white-dominated institutions ...benefit, and on a
subconscious level they know they benefit, from a certain amount of low
grade racism in the environment. If an occasional bigot or redneck calls

20. See, e.g. , Leonard M. Baynes, White Out: The Absence and Stereotyping of People of
Color by the Broadcast Networks in Prime Time Entertainment Programming, 45 ARIZ. L.
REV. 293 (2003).
21. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF
EVIL 274 (rev. ed. 1964).
22. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
23. Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
24. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
25. STANLEY FISH, THERE'S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH: AND IT'S A GOOD
THING, Too (1994).
26. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Pornography, supra note 14; Gary Peller, Race-Consciousness,
in CRITICAL RACE THEORY 127 (Kirnberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
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one of us a nigger or spic one night late as we're on our way home from
the library, that is all to the good....This kind of behavior keeps
nonwhite people on edge, a little off balance.... It prevents us from
digging in too strongly, starting to think we could really belong here. It
makes us a little introspective, a little unsure of ourselves; at the right
low-grade level it prevents us from organizing on behalf of more
important things.27

If Delgado's claim is true - and it very well might be - then it forces
Tsesis into an uncomfortable bind. Either he advocates locking the
whole white power structure of the institution up in jail, or he focuses
his criminal penalties on the "occasional bigot or redneck" whose
speech differs from all the rest only by making explicit what the others
alrea�y believe. Evil is banal when "many are prepared to play small
parts in systems that lead to evils they do not want to foresee. "28
Racism is similarly banal when it is so pervasive and subtle that it
becomes ordinary, expected, and invisible to those who are complicit
in it. In that case, the legal system is forced either to regard everyone
as guilty, or to focus only on the most egregious cases of people who
act on racist beliefs. Tsesis favors the former, but the ironic result is
that by deeming everyone guilty, his conception of complicity in the
harms of racism excuses everyone.
I.

RETHINKING FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE, FROM THE
GROUND UP

About halfway through the book, after discussing the historical
evidence that hate speech has played a causal role in some of history's
greatest moral disasters, Tsesis proposes to unsettle several bedrock
principles of free-speech jurisprudence. "The First Amendment value
of messages is significantly greater when they further justice, equality,
and social contentment than when their triumph in the marketplace
[of ideas] is solely based on the dominant power of proponents, no
matter how unethical they may be" (pp. 136-37). Read as a descriptive
statement, this sentence is so far off the mark that it might as well be
describing constitutional law on Venus.
In American First Amendment law, content- and viewpoint-based
regulation of speech is presumptively unconstitutional,29 so there is no

27. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?: HATE
SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT 186 n.88 (1997) (quoting
Richard Delgado, Address to the State Historical Society (Apr. 24, 1989)). Tsesis echoes this
argument. P. 113 ("Destructive messages are critical for a dominant group seeking to
consolidate its power.").
28. NEIMAN, supra note 7, at 286.
29. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Boos v. Barry , 485 U.S.
312 (1988); Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34
STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981); Geoffrey Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25
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basis for favoring messages that are favorable toward justice, equality,
and contentment over those that express a negative view;30 the power
a speaker has in the marketplace of ideas is not a sufficient ground for
limiting the speaker's expressive freedom;31 and some pretty base
messages, which do nothing to "further[] tranquility" (p. 139), are
permitted to go unpunished - consider flag burning,32 non-assaultive
cross-burning,33 vulgar and abusive language,34 and insinuating that
Jerry Falwell had sex with his mother in an outhouse.35 "True threats"
of violence, consisting of a serious expression of intent to commit an
imminent act of violence against an identified individual or group, may
be punished, 36 but it has been almost an axiomatic First Amendment
principle for decades that the Constitution protects a core of criticism,
advocacy, and political agitation falling short of incitement to
imminent violent action.37 Finally, to the extent the harms of social

MARY L. REV. 189 (1983). Naturally there are abundant examples of permissible
content discrimination in First Amendment law, which is the basis for Stanley Fish's
argument that there are no principled distinctions that can be drawn in this field. See
STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE (1999). Whatever one thinks of Fish's
argument that all law is politics, as a matter of the rhetoric that is internal to legal reasoning,
none of the instances of permitted content regulation would encompass something as broad
as a blanket prohibition on all racist speech. Cases involving hate crimes, such as Wisconsin
v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993), and Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), do establish a
principle that a defendant's racist beliefs may be taken into account as aggravating factors in
sentencing. But both Mitchell and Black addressed conduct that would be criminal whether
or not accompanied by an objectionable speech act. They do not permit making speech (or
belief) a crime independent of some other act.
WM. &

30. Cf West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. ").
31. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (calling "foreign to the First Amendment" the
view that the expenditures of wealthy people can be restricted in order to enhance the voice
of less affluent citizens). For critiques of Buckley that emphasize the value of equality, see,
for example, Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2470 (1997); Burt
Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 NW. U. L.
REV. 1055 ( 1999).
32. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
33. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); cf Black, 538 U.S. at 343 (2003) (upholding
state statute prohibiting cross burning with an intent to intimidate). Justice Thomas, in
dissent in Black, contended that there is no such thing as non-assaultive cross burning and,
analytically, cross burning should be treated as conduct instead of speech. See Id. at 388
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
34. Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
35. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
36. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 5 1 2 U.S. 753, 774 (1994); Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
37. KALVEN, supra note 13, at 229; STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE
MEANING OF AMERICA (1999). In Kalven's view, the state of constitutional law following
Brandenburg and New York Times is best stated by Judge Learned Hand's Masses opinion.

As Hand wrote:
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conditioning can be traced to the beliefs and actions of individual
citizens, not government actors, these harms cannot be balanced
against the expressive freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment,
because state action is not implicated in societal racism.38
Tsesis is well aware that existing American constitutional law gives
a "virtually unlimited license for hate speech" (p. 180), so it would be
incorrect to read his analysis of the law descriptively. His argument is
a normative one, that the law should be modified in light of the
empirical evidence he mounts up in the first half of the book. For
example, tragedies such as the Holocaust, the slave trade and slavery
(both historically in the United States and in contemporary societies
such as Mauritania), and the forcible removal of Native Americans
from western lands were caused, in part, by the spread of messages
that the victims deserved it - that they were subordinate or even
subhuman and their interests could be disregarded at will (pp. 3, 29,
51-52, 86, 101-02, 105-06, 116-17). In none of these cases did a single
speaker incite imminent lawless action. Rather, the climate grew
increasingly hostile by a process of accretion, in which countless
individuals repeated, relied upon, and made respectable the negative
cultural stereotypes that eventually legitimated acts of brutality. Tsesis
frequently emphasizes the gradualness of the changes, observing that
in Germany, for example, anti-Semitic attitudes began as isolated
bigotry, but subsequently became entrenched as broader social
intolerance, then oppression, and finally genocide (p. 18). If a similar
climate began to develop today, Tsesis worries that there would be no
single expressive flashpoint that could effectively be suppressed,
consistent with existing constitutional norms, to prevent mass murder.
The Rwandan disaster might serve as an illustration of this thesis, with
anti-Tutsi propaganda fanning the flames of somewhat subdued inter
group animosity which had never manifested itself in violence until
1959.39 Hateful speech was not the only cause of the genocide, but the
steady bombardment of messages that Tutsis were devils, cockroaches,
"outside the human race," and that the world could be made a better
0

Political agitation, by the passions it arouses or the convictions it engenders, may in fact
stimulate men to the violation of law. Detestation of existing policies is easily transformed
into forcible resistance of the authority which puts them in execution, and it would be folly
to disregard the causal relation between the two. Yet to assimilate agitation, legitimate as
such, with direct incitement to violent resistance, is to disregard the tolerance of all methods
of political agitation which in normal times is

a safeguard of free government.

See Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). Substituting "hate speech"
for

"political agitation" in this passage provides a direct refutation of Tsesis's thesis, if it is
understood descriptively.

38. Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 444-49 [hereinafter Lawrence, If He Hollers] (criticizing the
public/private distinction).
39. Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in
Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1244-45 (2000) [hereinafter Drumbl, Punishment].
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place by exterminating Tutsis, certainly helped break down ordinary
human moral restraints against killing.40
To the extent violence has its roots in beliefs that are
communicated by language or symbolic expression, American law
prohibits the government from responding to the threat of violence by
regulating speech, unless the speech can be characterized as an
incitement to imminent lawless acts. This proposition is borne out not
only by Brandenburg and its accepted interpretation,41 but also by the
history of the effort by some feminist critics of the First Amendment
to regulate certain kinds of pornography. A statute to address racist
violence by combating nonassaultive "misethnic"42 speech resembles
the attempt to reduce violence against women by outlawing
pornography that eroticizes violence against women. According to
Catharine MacKinnon, pornography harms women in several ways,
two of which are particularly relevant for our purposes. The first is by
standing in some causal relationship with violent sex crimes against
women; these crimes, MacKinnon argues, would not have occurred
but for the existence of pornography.43 The second is a kind of intrinsic
harm to women, not necessarily connected to physical violence,
resulting from being socially constructed as nothing more than objects
for the sexual pleasure of men.44 In the first case, the thesis that some
sexual violence is caused by exposure to pornography could be
subjected to empirical testing; the evidence on this point is ambiguous,
owing to the difficulty of isolating any one of the many causes of
violent sexual behavior in men.45 Similar studies can presumably shed
light on Tsesis's claim that exposure to racist ideas leads to an increase
in violence against members of disfavored minority groups, which he

40. GLOVER, supra note 4, at 120-22; POWER, supra note 4, at 330, 338-40; Drumbl,
Punishment, supra note 39, at 1 244-47.
41. KALVEN, supra note 13, at 1 1 9 (arguing that, after Brandenburg, speech can be
characterized as harm only if it becomes so closely linked to force that we perceive it as the
exercise of force).
0

42. Misethnicity is Tsesis's neologism for institutionalized hatred of ethnic groups; it

includes "consistently disapproving, hypercritical, and oft-reiterated generalizations about
groups and persons belonging to them." Pp. 2, 81. Similarly, I use the term "hate speech "
throughout this review to denote "any expression of an idea that color marks a person as
suspect in morals or ability, unworthy of first-class respect and consideration, or unfit for
company or society. " See Frank Michelman, Universities, Racist Speech and Democracy in
America: An Essay for the ACLU, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339 (1992).
43. See MacKinnon, Pornography, supra note 14, at 43-50, 52-53.
44. Id. at 7-8, 17-18, 27, 54-56; see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321 (1984) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue].

45. See, e.g., 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE
TO OTHERS 150 (1985) (taking a skeptical view of the claim that pornography has a
substantial causal role in sexual violence); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First
Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 597-600 [hereinafter Sunstein, Pornography]

(summarizing studies and calling the evidence suggestive, but not dispositive).
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occasionally makes in a very strong form, arguing that "[a]lthough
hate speech does not always lead to organized supremacism, it is a
necessary ingredient to that end."46 The second kind of harm is
entirely different, because it relies on an intrinsic injury, which we
might call "inequality constructed by hateful speech,'' to justify
restrictions on expression. On this view, speech is discrimination,
degradation, and an attack on the personhood of victims.47 Tsesis
relies on both kinds of harm to make the case for criminalizing hate
speech.48
Despite the best efforts of what I have labeled "the new left First
Amendment critics,"49 courts generally conceptualize these harms as
cognitive responses to persuasion, not harm per se.50 To put it crudely,
courts imagine the sequence of events:
speech -7 listener forms belief -7 acts on belief to cause harm
rather than the sequence imagined by the new left critics:
speech -7 harm
Once the intermediate step involving persuasion is entrenched into
our thinking about the First Amendment, a welter of familiar
principles seem to follow inexorably: There is no such thing as a false
idea,51 the government must be prohibited from discriminating on the
basis of viewpoint,52 offense alone is not a sufficient justification for
restricting speech,53 and above all that "the theory of our
Constitution" is that government must rely on the marketplace of
46. P. 170. For a sophisticated discussion of various ways to interpret Tsesis's causal
claims, see Anuj C. Desai, Attacking Brandenburg with History: Does the Long-Term Harm
of Biased Speech Justify a Criminal Statute Suppressing It?, 55 FED . COMM. L.J. 353, 367-79
(2003) (reviewing Destructive Messages).
47. See also DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 27, at 47-48; Lawrence, If He Hollers,
supra note 38, at 442-44.
48. For the first type of harms see, for example, p. 1 1 7 ("Beliefs about the purported
irremediable evil or insignificance of outgroups drives negative attitudes to a frenzy that can
blow up into cataclysmic consequences. . . . Cultural preparation for perpetrating crimes
against humanity takes time and is vastly more dangerous than fighting words that lead to
fisticuffs. "); p. 168 ("Hate speech rarely results in only short-term harms. More commonly, it
is developed by succeeding generations and becomes part of social interaction and political
culture. "). For the second category of harms see, for example, p. 89 ("Misethnic mental
devices reduce an entire segment of the population into profligate, pernicious, and dastardly
subhumans, quite different from ingroup members."); p. 166-68 (cataloging harms such as
"undermining a sense of personal integrity, " "making people feel unwelcome, " and
"marking off people as appropriate for shunning and exclusion").
49. See W. Bradley Wendel, "Certain Fundamental Truths": A Dialectic on Negative and
Positive Liberty in Hate-Speech Cases, LAW & CONTEMP. PRO BS., Spring 2002, at 33.
50. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 191
(1993); Geoffrey R. Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint-Discrimination, 9
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 461 (1986).
51. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
52. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984).
53. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
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ideas to certify the truth of ideas.54 As Tsesis rightly points out, many
of these doctrines implicitly rely on skepticism in the realm of moral
epistemology (pp. 130-35) - courts assume that per se harms are the
result of false beliefs and the government should not be in the business
of regulating speech that might persuade people to form false beliefs.55
Even a nonskeptical court might admit that a belief is false, but
nevertheless be unwilling to empower the government to make
decisions about the truth or falsity of ideas, for fear that it might abuse
that power.56
I have never found this argument terribly satisfying, at least in the
weak form it is usually offered. Government officials make value
laden regulatory decisions all the time, sometimes on the basis of
ambiguous evidence,57 and yet the ordinary response by citizens and
commentators to a misbegotten government decision is not to wave
the Barnette flag and cry "imposition of orthodoxy!" Rather, critics
attack the policy on its merits, on factual and normative grounds. In
the weak form of the argument, the government ought not to take a
position on moral issues, because there is no such thing as objectivity
in the domain of moral reasoning. As Judge Easterbrook puts it in
Hudnut, the government should not be "the great censor and director
of which thoughts are good for us."58 Tsesis gives the obvious response
throughout his book: a policy that is based on the inhumanity of Jews
or African Americans is vastly more wrongheaded and harmful than
one that is based on an erroneous view of the relationship between an
environmental pollutant and the risk of developing cancer. It is
incoherent to permit the government to exercise discretion in the
latter kind of case but not the former, if the reason for precluding it
from making normative decisions in the first case is the fear that it will
make the wrong one. (The strong form of the argument, that the
government is systematically not as capable of private actors of
making any decisions, on moral or empirical matters,59 is more
plausible, but few people seem consistently to rely on it.) To the
extent we grant the government power at all, civil libertarians would

54. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
55. See David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 334 (1991).
56. Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328-31 (7th Cir. 1985), atfd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986); cf Frederick Schauer, Harry Kalven and the Perils of Particularism, 56 U.
CHI. L. REv. 397, 414 (1989) (arguing that abstraction in constitutional decisionmaking is
justified by the desire to remove discretion from a decisionmaker).
57. See Sunstein, Pornography, supra note 45, at 600-01 (discussing decision by OSHA
to reduce permissible levels of industrial exposure to benzene, despite lack of clear evidence
of a causal connection between exposure at the existing level and increased cancer risk).
58. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 330.
59. See, e.g. , F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
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seem to have the burden of establishing why that power should not be
used to prevent the harms that flow from pornography and hate
speech, which are certainly as serious as other harms that we permit
government to act to eliminate.
II.

LEGAL RESPONSES TO THE BANALITY OF RACISM

One reason we might not want to involve the legal system in
mitigating the harm of hate speech is that the underlying problem is
not amenable to the kinds of legal responses advocated by Tsesis. Not
every social ill can be redressed through the means of criminal
punishment.6() This is not equivalent to several familiar arguments
against regulating racist speech, such as that it is impermissible to
regulate morality, that regulating speech is a distraction from the real
business of remedying social inequality,61 that criminalizing hate
speech will just drive racist messages underground,62 or that it involves
the government in scary thought control. Rather, the normative
argument against hate-speech regulation depends on conceptions of
complicity and responsibility that deserve deeper investigation.
I have been discussing the example of Rwanda, because it shows
how a massive number of individuals can be complicit in the most
horrendous crimes - hundreds of thousands of police officers,
members of the armed forces, militia members, civil servants, and
ordinary citizens personally participated in the massacres while, and
millions of others passively acquiesced in the violence.63 It was also
strongly connected with speech, with government-operated media
outlets constantly exhorting Hutus to kill Tutsis (which were referred
to as "cockroaches") and Hutus enthusiastically following those
instructions.64 The Rwanda case shows that the appropriate legal
response to pervasive evil must be carefully considered in light of the
social goals of preventing its recurrence, reconciling victims and
aggressors who must continue to live together in society, and

60. Cf Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353
(1978).
61. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 27, at 111-19.
62. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 37, at 81.
63. Drumbl, Punishment, supra note 39, at 1246-47.
64. GLOVER, supra note 4, at 121-22 (discussing radio station which broadcast messages
such as, "The grave is only half full. Who will help us to fill it?"); Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, '!I'll 123, 148-49 (Sept. 2, 1998), available at
http://www.ictr.org (I am grateful to Mark Drumbl for this reference). Radio stations also
broadcast names, addresses, and license plate numbers of Tutsis and moderate Hutus. See
POWER, supra note 4, at 333. This practice is chillingly similar to the so-called "Nuremberg
files " web site, which posted identifying information about doctors who perform abortions.
See Steven G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and the First Amendment Value of Threats, 78 TEX.
L. REV. 541 (2000).
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attributing the appropriate measure of moral responsibility to the
perpetrators of harmful acts. Tsesis uses similar grave humanitarian
catastrophes, such as the Holocaust and African slavery, to challenge
the assumption in First Amendment law that the wrong of suppressing
racist speech exceeds the wrong that results from it.
But it is important not to overstate these comparisons. Even Tsesis
does not argue that racist speech usually works as it did in Rwanda.
Rather, the harm accrues gradually, though successive generations, as
stereotypes become ingrained at an unconscious level in the belief
systems of a large number of individuals {pp. 168, 193, 198). It
becomes part of the background set of assumptions that a person
simply accepts as given.65 Thus, the evil of racism becomes banal in
Hannah Arendt's sense of that word. Philosopher Susan Neiman has
applied the banality of evil concept to the Nazi genocide:
Jurisprudence views heinous crimes as those done with malice and
forethought. Both these components of intention were often missing in
many agents who carried out the daily work of extermination. Sadists,
and

particularly

venomous

antisemites,

were

present

among

the

murderers, but the SS sought to avoid using those who took obvious
pleasure in murder, and most of it was carried out as routine. Vicious
hatred was far less in evidence than might be expected among the lower
echelons of those who took over the killing. The opportunity to avoid
being sent to fight at the front enlisted far more concentration camp
guards than did the opportunity to torment Jews. At the highest levels,
not only malice, but clear view of the consequences of one's actions was
often missing as well. Eichmann is only the most famous Nazi official
whose initial goals had nothing to do with mass murder and everything to
do with petty desires for personal advancement. At every level, the Nazis
produced more evil, with less malice, than civilization had previously
known.66

In a case like the Holocaust, social and institutional structures that
tended to diffuse responsibility acted to amplify the potential for harm
created by a few highly motivated and malicious individuals. The
crucial disconnect is between the goals of individuals, such as the
desire for personal advancement, and the harms that accrue as a result
of their actions. Similarly, where racism is unconscious and taken for
granted, the explanation for violence against members of disfavored
groups is more complex than the malevolence of a single racist
speaker and those who hear the message and react. In other words,
there is no neat one-to-one causal connection between the motivations
and desires of actors and imminent harm, as the Brandenburg test
demands before the speech of individuals can be regulated.

65. Cf DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 27, at 71-72; Lawrence, Unconscious
Racism, supra note 10, at 322; MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, supra note 44, at 325-29.
66. NEIMAN, supra note 7, at 270-71.
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One of the problems with Tsesis's attempt to prevent harm by
targeting speech is that racist messages only have salience, and
therefore power, when they resonate with categories and beliefs that
are already entrenched. "Years of anti-Semitic speech in Germany
preceded the rise of National Socialism and the perpetration of the
Holocaust," he observes.67 The problem with using this correlation to
establish causation is that anti-Semitism preceded anti-Semitic speech;
if that were not true, no one would have paid attention to anti
Semites. Imagine a rather confused bigot who tried to whip up
discrimination on the basis of stereotypes and images that no one else
shared - say, that all Irish people are greedy or that all gay men are
lazy. The result would only be ridiculous, and would certainly not
contribute to an environment of hostility against the targeted groups.
Perhaps a carefully coordinated and consistently maintained campaign
could succeed at stirring up hatred against a group that wasn't already
the object of social opprobrium,68 but in the cases Tsesis describes, the
targets of hate speech (and later the victims of physical violence) were
groups that had long been persecuted by the majority.
In the usual case, hate speech requires racist beliefs as a
precondition for its effect, so it is not nearly as dangerous unless a
history of scapegoating, exclusion, disparagement, and discrimination
has already laid the groundwork for people to act on the basis of the
messages that are communicated. Tsesis admits as much when he
notes that "[t]he Nazis effective[ly] utilized nineteenth-century anti
Semitic slogans . . . to gain political power, pass the Nuremberg laws,
and attempt to exterminate the Jews" (p. 139). Thus, he is caught in
the dilemma mentioned previously; he must either criminalize every
act that contributes to the entrenchment of damaging stereotypes
(telling racist jokes, using broad and demeaning characterizations in
popular media portrayals of racial and ethnic minorities, and so on), or
target his remedy more narrowly but with less effect on the resulting
harm. A closely tailored remedy might be called for, and indeed Tsesis
cites examples from other Western democracies to show that criminal
penalties for hate speech are not incompatible with a relatively free
society (Chapter Twelve). His insistence that hate speech be punished
only when the speaker has "intentionally encouraged persons to
commit inhumane acts against an identifiable outgroup" (p. 203) also
suggests a narrow approach.
The clear thrust of his book, however, is in favor of significantly
broader prohibitions. He says that legal rules should be "drafted to
prevent disparaging stereotypes from ingraining themselves in the
67. P. 136; see also pp. 200-01 (noting that hate speech "draw[s] upon and buttress[es]
social hierarchies and age-old schemata that have been used for perpetuating enslavement,
exploitation, and subjugation").
68. See FEINBERG, supra note 45, at 149.
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social conscience" (p. 198), and that "charismatic leaders should be
prohibited from harnessing racist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic
ideologies to further discrimination and achieve ruinous objectives"
(p. 203). Although his proposed statute includes language limiting it to
"inciting" utterances, Tsesis is not using incitement as a term of art
invoked in Hand's Masses opinion and in Brandenburg to protect a
core of criticism, protest, rebellion, and advocacy short of a call for
imminent violent action.69 Instead, he drops any requirement of
immediate harm causally related to the utterance, insisting that even
"when no imminent threat of grand-scale racial and ethnic intolerance
looms, legislative policy should still prohibit hate speech" (p. 203). He
emphasizes that the true social dangers associated with hate speech
are not fisticuffs (as the Chaplinsky fighting words test7° imagines) or a
mob incited to violent acts, but the long-term entrenchment of
disparaging beliefs that tends to legitimize discrimination and even
violence against disfavored groups (pp. 4, 1 17, 130, 137-39, 168-69, 193,
198, 201, 204). There is simply no way to understand his book as
anything other than a utopian attempt to root out racism from the
hearts and minds of individuals, by attempting to suppress language
that tends to have the effect of creating racist beliefs.71 It is precisely
the banality of racism that Tsesis is attacking. His hope is that
aggressive enforcement, through the criminal law, targeted at
language that transmits misethnic messages, will make racism
exceptional, rather than pervasive and practically invisible.
I am not an expert in the cognitive and social psychology of racism,
discrimination, the formation of racist ideologies, and the connection
between holding racist stereotypes and acting on them. Disregarding
those empirical issues, however, the potential effectiveness of his
proposals is complicated further by the political history of racism in
the United States. Steven Shiffrin's cautionary analysis is worth
keeping in mind.72 In light of the resentment that many whites already
69. Cf KALVEN, supra note 13, at 127-28, 229-31.
70. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Charles Lawrence has
argued that face-to-face racist speech ought to be understood as the functional equivalent of
fighting words, because it has the same immediate impact. Lawrence, If He Hollers, supra
note 38, at 452-55. Questions of whether Chaplinsky is still good law are irrelevant to the
analysis of Tsesis's book, because he advocates legal prohibition of words that extends far
beyond the fairly limited category of fighting words.
71. Although Tsesis claims his proposed anti-hate speech statute is "tailored narrowly
enough to protect First Amendment rights, but . . . is also sufficiently farseeing to prevent
future harms to identifiable outgroups," p. 199, I do not think he can thread that needle.
Given his definition of the harm of hate speech, as the subtle, almost imperceptible cultural
shift that gradually makes bigotry seem normal, there is no way to prevent it with a statute
that is tailored to take account of existing First Amendment principles. As a normative
argument, Tsesis's book is interesting; as a brief filed ia an appellate court, unfortunately, it
would not fare very well.
72 See SHIFFRIN, supra note 37, at 82-85.
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feel toward what they (wrongly) perceive to be the government's
efforts to help racial and ethnic minorities, and the almost mystical
reverence that Americans feel toward the First Amendment,73 it could
be dangerous to effectively make racists into martyrs for free
expression and individuals' resistance to the power of an overbearing
state. The result would be to increase long-term racism, precisely what
Tsesis is concerned to avoid. It is significant that Shiffrin traces this
backlash effect to the diffuse racism that affects American society as a
whole.74 In a sense, he and Tsesis are looking at the same empirical
data but interpreting it very differently - Shiffrin as a reason to move
cautiously in the domain of legal regulation, Tsesis as a reason to enact
even more sweeping prohibitions. I do not know how to settle this
interpretive dispute, but I would like to close this Review with some
thoughts about what might be morally attractive in Tsesis's approach,
and what might be problematic.
The constitutional law governing regulation of hate speech shares
with mainstream moral philosophy a strong emphasis on making
individualistic judgments of accountability. As Christopher Kutz
argues, in opposition to this tradition, significant harms occur as a
result of institutional structures that serve to diffuse responsibility by
creating bureaucratic impediments to individual accountability.75 The
conventional position in ethics is that a person is morally blameworthy
for a harm only if what that person did made a difference to the
outcome - that is, if she could have produced it or prevented it by
actions within her control.76 This approach means that individuals can
regard harm as "not my problem," but of course the occurrence of the
harm depends on the passive acquiescence or indifference, if not the
active participation, of a critical mass of individuals. Similarly, under
the Brandenburg test in constitutional law, an utterance may be
punished only if there is a tight connection between the words and an
imminent lawless act, so that, in effect, the speaker could have avoided
the outcome by not uttering the words. Kutz urges that we should
understand the ascription of responsibility differently, so that it tracks
intentional participation in wrong, rather than an individual's ability to
cause or prevent harm.77 Thus, we would blame individuals morally
when they act with "participatory intention," that is, with a view

73. See Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opponunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT:
FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 175, 193 (Lee c. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds.,
2002) (observing the unique symbolic value of the First Amendment in public discourse).
74. SHIFFRIN, supra note 37, at 85.
75. CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE
(2000).
76. Id. at 116.
77. Id. at 122.
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toward contributing to a collective outcome.78
As Kutz recognizes, though, there are serious harms that cannot be
characterized as the product of jointly intentional action, but as
uncoordinated individual action that aggregates to produce some
harm; he distinguishes this type of "unstructured collective harm,"
such as the environmental degradation caused by millions of
individual polluters, from easier cases such as hundreds of aircrew
members participating in a bombing raid, where each individual shares
the intention to drop bombs on the target.79 Individual polluters often
do not intend to cause harm, although they may be indifferent to it,
while each bomber crew intends the resulting harm, although the
individual contribution of each plane does not make a difference to
the destruction of the target. The ascription of moral responsibility to
individuals who act without participatory intention is a real stretch for
ethics, because institutional mechanisms such as markets threaten to
make everyone inevitably complicit in a great deal of suffering. The
locus of environmental harms seems to be something like
"capitalism," "globalization," or "technology" rather than anything
specific to the individual agent which is usually taken to be the object
of moral evaluation (Ted Kacszynski, the Unabomber, understood
this !). For that reason, Kutz shifts the focus of analysis to "ways of
life" or communities of individuals who share values such as
conspicuous consumption, and maintains that this kind of sharing of
values is sufficient to implicate individuals in a quasi-participatory
manner of wrongdoing.80 Ways of life arise from "unreflective
confluences of habit and sentiment" and tacit agreements that are
shaped by culture, environment, upbringing, and a host of other
factors.81
This should sound familiar, because it is exactly the model of
accountability for the harm caused by hate speech that Tsesis
proposes. He also aims at collective institutions and expresses hope
that criminal prohibitions on hate speech might work to alter
individual commitments to racist ways of life. "Restrictions on
misethnic speech communicate society's disapprobation [of]
movements that aim to harm vulnerable minorities" (p. 196). But
there is a serious conceptual problem with simply mapping this
conception of responsibility onto the problem of hate speech.
Responsibility for collective harms, caused by tacit participation in
one's way of life, belongs to a morality of value, not obligation.
Roughly, the morality of obligation adopts the third-personal
78. Id. at 74-81.
79. Id. at 166-67.
80. Id. at 186-90.
81. Id. at 188-89.
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standpoint of a spectator or critic who expresses moral judgments
about the agent.82 A morality of value, by contrast, takes a first-person
perspective and evaluates the character of agents in terms of virtues or
ideal conceptions of the good life. Just as Kutz wishes to focus on the
harms caused by consumerism or globalization, Tsesis seeks to shift
the object of evaluation from the intent and actions of individual
speakers to the macro-structures of racism. This perspective-shifting
move is controversial in philosophy precisely because it diverges from
the predominant assumption of liberal individualism that collective
goods have instrumental value only.83 Liberalism imagines
autonomous agents, standing apart from prior commitments and
attachments, making uncoerced choices about what sorts of projects to
pursue and what kinds of lives to lead.84 Liberal premises are evident
in such familiar First Amendment maxims as the requirement of
viewpoint neutrality, the Barnette anti-orthodoxy principle, and the
exclusion of certain kinds of emotive harms as the basis for restrictions
on speech.
Rejecting individualism might mean adopting something like a
communitarian perspective, in which collective and social goods and
values are held to be prior to individual rights and duties.85 These
community values can then become the object of evaluation. Although
Tsesis claims to be a contractarian (pp. 150, 196), he is far more prone
to employ the rhetoric of communitarianism, speaking in terms of
"further[ing] social contentment" (p. 136), "overall social well-being"
{p. 138), and the value of "tranquility" as opposed to instability (p.
139). He is more interested in a morality of value than a morality of
obligation and, when translated into the political and legal domain,
this commitment leads him to embrace communitarianism. But,
communitarian ideals such as shared identification with a common
cultural and moral heritage tend not to lend themselves to coercive
enforcement. Because the criminal law is primarily a concern of
82 See Stuart Hampshire, Fallacies in Moral Philosophy, in REVISIONS: CHANGING
PERSPECTIVES IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 51 (Stanley Hauerwas & Alasdair Macintyre eds.,
1983). For the structure of a legal system dominated by a morality of obligation, see the four
volume Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, by Joel Feinberg. As he discusses in the summary

of his argument that opens volume four, political liberalism begins with a presumption in
favor of liberty, which can be overcome in favor of government coercion only where
necessary to prevent certain kinds of harms. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS
WRONGDOING ix-xx (1988).
83. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 198-203 (1986) (criticizing

individualism).
84. See, e.g. , MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 59-65

(1982).
85. See, e.g. , STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS & COMMUNITARIANS 1 5
(2d ed. 1996) ("According t o this communitarian objection, the liberal sees society as
nothing more than a cooperative venture for the pursuit of individual advantage."); Frank
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
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individuals, it is not well targeted to affect organic aspects of a
community such as its value commitments. While it may be possible to
reform the community as a whole, means subtler than the criminal law
will be required. Examples could include: strengthening intermediate
groups,86 promoting decentralization and local control,87 or ensuring
that the voices of traditionally disempowered groups are heard in the
lawmaking process.88 In his discussion of the historical development of
racist ideology, Tsesis has identified a real problem, but one that
overwhelms the capacity of the criminal law to respond adequately.
CONCLUSION

One might think that I am advocating a do-nothing stance in the
face of a serious social problem. Isn't that letting a lot of people off the
hook for the evils of racism? I think the answer is no, because
criminalizing something so diffuse and pervasive - so banal - would
potentially make criminals of everyone living in a society suffused by
racism. To reply that only the most serious criminals should be
charged would be to deny the power of Tsesis's historical analysis.
Hate speech does its harm through a gradual process of making
inhumanity conceivable, creating a belief structure that is taken for
granted and invisible to people who operate within it. The problem
with the criminal law is that it marks out conduct as violations - as
acts that are extraordinary, and beyond the limits of tolerable
behavior. By labeling racism as deviant, Tsesis might actually obscure
the implications of his broader critique, which is that it affects all of us
and is anything but extraordinary.

86. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713 (1988).
87. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1555-56
(1988).
88. See Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97
YALE L.J. 1609 (1988).

